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Recent Decisions
LABOR LAW-EXTORTION AS DEFINED BY THE HOBBS ACT AND ITS RELA-
TION TO LEGITIMATE LABOR OBJECTIVES-In a 5-4 decision, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that extortion as defined by the
Hobbs Act does not proscribe violence committed during a lawful
strike for the purpose of inducing an employer's agreement to legiti-
mate collective bargaining demands.
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
FACTS INVOLVED
A one-count indictment was returned in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,' charging four defendants
with violating the amended Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, popularly
known as the Hobbs Act.2 Three of the defendants were members of
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 390, which
represented the employees of independent contractors engaged by Gulf
States Utilities Company. The fourth defendant was a member of
Local 2286 of the same union which represented the employees of Gulf
States Utilities Company. Gulf States Utilities Company is an interstate
public utility engaged in supplying electric power.
Both unions were on strike for higher wages and improved working
conditions when five acts of violence8 were alleged to have been com-
mitted in furtherance of a conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce
by the use of extortion. 4
1. United States v. Enmons, 335 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. La. 1971).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Hobbs Act], amending 18
U.S.C. §§ 420(a)-(d) (1940). The Hobbs Act providis in pertinent part:(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the move-
ment of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts
or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or
property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this
section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(b) As used in this section ....(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.(3) The term "commerce" means ... all commerce between any point in a State
and any point outside thereof .(c) This section stall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 of Title
15, sections 52, 101-115, 151-166 of Title 29 or sections 151-188 of Title 45.
3. The alleged acts consisted of firing high powered rifles into company transformer
stations on three occasions, draining oil from a company transformer, and blowing up a
company transformer substation.
4. Count number 9 of the indictment particularly charged as follows:
9. It was a part of said conspiracy that the defendants and the co-conspirators would
obtain the property of the Gulf States Utilities Company in the form of wages and
383
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The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
indictment for failure to state a federal offense as defined by the Hobbs
Act. The bedrock for the dismissal was the district court's findings:
first, the strike itself was legal;5 second, the objective of the strike was
a legitimate labor objective (i.e., to obtain higher wages6); and third,
the unions had a right to disrupt their employers' business by a lawful
strike.7 The district court concluded that, although the violent acts
were undoubtedly punishable under Louisiana state law,8 they did not
constitute extortion as defined by the Hobbs Act, because the acts of
violence were in furtherance of a legitimate labor objective in the form
of higher wages for needed and desired services.9 The district court
cited United States v. Kemble' ° as good authority for its view that "If
the wages sought by violent acts are wages to be paid for unneeded or
unwanted services, or for no services at all,"'" then that violence would
constitute extortion as proscribed by the Hobbs Act, but that in this
case the services were necessary and sought by the employer and as
such there was no misappropriation of property as is necessary to con-
stitute extortion.
THE DECISION
The factual situation involved in Enmons was of first impression to
the Supreme Court. However, it is apparent from a review of the
legislative history of the Hobbs Act, that the manner in which the
Supreme Court might react to this particular factual situation was a
source of heated disagreement.1
2
other things of value with the consent of the Gulf States Utilities Company, its
officers and agents, such consent to be induced by the wrongful use of actual force,
violence and fear of economic injury by said defendants and co-conspirators in that
defendants and co-conspirators did commit acts of physical violence and destruction
against property owned by the Gulf States Utilities Company in order to force said
Company to agree to a contract with Local 2286 of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers calling for higher wages and other monetary benefits.
335 F. Supp. at 642.
5. Id. at 645.
6. Id. at 644.
7. Id. at 646.
8. Id. Under Louisiana law the acts alleged to have been committed are criminally
punishable as aggravated arson, simple arson, aggravated criminal damage to property,
simple criminal damage to property, or a criminal conspiracy or an attempt to commit
the aforementioned offenses. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:26-27, 51-52, 55-56 (1951).
9. 335 F. Supp. at 646. "It is the opinion of this court that neither the wages of bona-
fide employees nor the 'right to negotiate employment contracts-without illegal disrup-
tion' constitute 'property' as contemplated by the Hobbs Act." Id.
10. 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1955).
11. 335 F. Supp. at 645.
12. 91 CONG. REc. 11899-922 (1945); 89 CONG. REc. 3200-30 (1943). See Comment, Fed-
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The Hobbs Act came into being because of the construction placed
upon the original Federal Anti-Racketeering Act 1 3 by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Teamsters Local 807.14 In that case, the de-
fendants were members of Teamsters Local 807 and were convicted
under the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act for conspiring to, and actually
using violence to obtain from non-Local 807 truck drivers the payment
of a union day's wages for the "services" of Local 807. The Local 807
teamsters would wait at the various entry tunnels to New York City
and stop incoming trucks. Three different factual circumstances were
then involved: (1) The non-Local 807 truck driver would actually
"hire" the Local 807 member and the member would drive the truck
into New York City, unload it, and return it to the point of origin of
the "hiring"; (2) The non-Local 807 truck driver would refuse to hire
a Local 807 member, but would be forced to pay a union day's wages
to continue into the city; (3) the non-Local 807 truck driver would
agree to "hire" the member, but the member would refuse to work,
and the truck driver would still have to pay the required "wage."
Both the union and the individual defendants appealed their con-
victions to the Supreme Court, where the issue was defined as ascer-
taining the limits of section 2(a) which excepts from punishment any
person who "obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use or attempt to
use or threat to use force, violence or coercion . . . the payment of
wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee."15
In a detailed examination of the statute, the Supreme Court held
that in the first situation, the immunity clause would protect the actor
eral Legislation, Labor Law-A New Federal Antiracketeering Law, 35 GEO. L.J. 362
(1947); Note, The Hobbs Act-An Amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, 25
N.C.L. REv. 58 (1946); Note, Labor Faces the Amended Anti-Racketeering Act, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 1030 (1953).
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 420(a)-(d) (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). In pertinent
part the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act provided:
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any
degree affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to
move in trade or commerce-
(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use of or attempt to use or threat to use
force, violence, or coercion, the payment of money or other valuable considerations,
or the purchase or rental of property or protective services, not including, however,
the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee; or
) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
re or fear, or under color of official right; or(c) Commits or threatens to commit an act of physical violence or physical injury
to a person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to violate sections (a)
or (b) ....
Id. § (a)-(c) (emphasis added).
14. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
15. Id. at 527.
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from punishment, and in the third situation no immunity would be
afforded.16 The genesis for the Hobbs Act is found in the Supreme
Court's holding that in cases of the second instance 17 immunity would
be afforded to the actor.' The Supreme Court thus interpreted the
Federal Anti-Racketeering Act to mean that the guilt or innocence of
the actor depended upon his intent, and that this was a question for
the fact-finder to determine.1 9
The reaction of Congress to Teamsters Local 807 was marked by
cries that the Supreme Court, by its "mis-construction" of the Federal
Anti-Racketeering Act, had freed unions to commit highway robbery
with impunity.20 The Court's emphasis on the objective of the actor
in connection with the statutory immunity clause was not well re-
ceived, and a number of bills were rapidly introduced to "correct" the
decision.21
The net result of the hearings and debates was the present Hobbs
Act which amended the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act in three major
ways:
(1) The immunity clause relating to the payment of wages by a
bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee was deleted; 22
(2) Robbery and extortion, as defined within the Hobbs Act became
the basic crimes;23
(3) Section 6, which safeguarded the "rights of bona-fide labor or-
ganizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof" was replaced by a more specific section.24
16. Id. at 534.' Thus, there is no conspiracy to violate the act if the purpose of the
defendants is actually to perform the services in return for the money, but there is a
punishable conspiracy if their plan is to obtain money without doing the work.
17. Id. The doubtful case arises where the defendants agree to tender their services in
good faith to an employer and to work if he accepts their offer, but agree further that
the protection of their trade union interests requires that he should pay an amount
equivalent to the prevailing union wage even if he rejects their proffered services.
We think that such an agreement is covered by the exception.
Id.
18. "... the jury was bound to acquit the defendants if it found that their objective
and purpose was to obtain by the use or threat of violence the chance to work for the
money but to accept the money even if the employers refused to permit them to work."
Id. at 538.
19. Id. at 534.
20. 91 CONG. REC. 11899-922 (1945); 89 CONG. REC. 3200-30 (1943).
21. S. 2347, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 32, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 653,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R. 7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); H.R. 6872, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
23. Compare note 2 supra with note 13 supra.
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(c) (1970). The references in subsection (c) are to the exemption
of labor organizations from the antitrust laws, a restriction on injunctive relief against
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In Enmons the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
limits of extortion as defined by the Hobbs Act in relation to violence
occurring during an admittedly legitimate strike. Under the Hobbs
Act it is essential that the government prove both interference with
interstate commerce and extortion.25 In Enmons interference with
interstate commerce was not controverted, but the presence of extor-
tion was in issue.
Extortion has traditionally been considered a compound felony re-
quiring both a felonious or "corrupt" intent (as in all of the larceny-
type offenses) and a wrongful taking of another's property.2 At common
law extortion was a species of misdemeanor crime that was perpetrated
by a public official in the corrupt demanding of a fee when none was
due, or more than was then due.2 7 A corrupt intent was necessary at
common law in that there must have been an intention on the part of
the actor to take something to which he was not entitled.28 Although
there are some courts that profess that a showing of criminal intent
may be made by merely showing the use of wrongful means, 29 in
closer analysis these courts tend to follow the weight of the majority of
courts that hold that the objective sought itself must be illegitimate
to constitute extortion.3 0
The definition of extortion used in the Hobbs Act was taken essen-
tially from the New York Penal Code as well as the. common law in-
terpretations.31 The New York statute requires a felonious intent to
misappropriate another's property.3 2 In regard to extortion in the con-
labor unions, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the National Labor Relations Act and the Rail-
way Labor Act, respectively.
Section 6 of the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act was deleted because it was thought to
be too vague and, therefore, capable of. being misunderstood by the Supreme Court. 91
CONG. REc. 11912 (1945).
In Teamsters Local 807, the Court utilized section 6 and stated that although section 6
was obscure, it strengthened the Court in its opinion that Congress did not intend to
affect the ordinary activities of labor unions. 315 U.S. at 535.
25. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
26. LaTour v. Stone, 139 Fla. 681, 693-94, 190 So. 704, 709-10 (1939) (to constitute
"extortion," money or other things of value must have been willfully and corruptly de-
manded and received).
27. R. BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME § 273 (1946).
28. Id. § 277.
29. People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 172 P. 152 (1918); State v. Phillips, 62 Idaho 656, 115
P.2d 418 (1941); State v. Richards, 97 Wash. 587, 167 P. 47 (1917).
30. In Beggs the defendant sought forty times the amount due him; in Phillips an
instruction was allowed which would limit prosecution to circumstances where the actor
sought more than the amount due; Richards has been restricted by State v. Bums, 161
Wash. 362, 297 P. 212 (1931), which held that no extortion is present if the threat is
limited to an amount actually due.
M. 91 CONG. REc. 11842-43, 11900, 11910 (1945); 89 CONG REc. 3226 (1943). The defini-
tion of extortion was patterned after section 850 of the New York Penal Code of 1909.
32. In interpreting N.Y. PF.NA, CODE § 850 (1909), the New York courts have stated,
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text of labor activities, the New York courts have ruled that when the
object of the activity was the personal enrichment of the actor, rather
than the betterment of the worker or the good faith advancement of
unionism, then the activities constituted extortion. 33
In the Supreme Court's analysis of extortion as set forth in the
Hobbs Act, the majority placed great emphasis on the word "wrong-
ful" and concluded that "wrongful" was meant to limit ". . . the
statute's coverage to those instances where the obtaining of property
would itself be 'wrongful' because the alleged extortionist has no law-
ful claim to that property."34 The Court considered that if "wrongful"
was meant to modify the means used to obtain property, then it would
be superfluous and redundant to speak of "wrongful" violence to ob-
tain property. The sponsor was questioned about the word "wrongful"
in the congressional debates, and he responded that it was there to
"qualify" the entire section 3 Unfortunately the colloquy was not pur-
sued to determine if the "qualification" related to the means or to the
objective. Yet it is apparent from the legislative history that the in-
terpretation placed upon "extortion" by the Court's majority was cor-
rect for the proponents of the Hobbs Act repeatedly denied that it
would in any manner interfere with any legitimate labor objective or
activity.386 Even the government, in its brief in Teamsters Local 807,
"[t]he intent to extort or gain must be wrongful and unlawful 'to obtain that which injustice and equity the party is not entitled to receive.' The ultimate object and intent
of the party here accused was not the 'lucri causa' which must always characterize the act."
People v. Cuddihy, 151 Misc. 318, 324, 271 N.Y.S. 450, 456 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1934), aff'd, 243
App. Div. 694, 277 N.Y.S. 960 (1935). In People v. Sheridan, 186 App. Div. 211, 213, 174
N.Y.S. 327, 329 (1919) the courts considered sections 850-51 and stated, "[t]he unlawfulness
lies in the motive. If its purpose be unlawful then the act (which under other conditions
might be justified) becomes unlawful." Id. See People v. Gassman, 182 Misc. 878, 45
N.Y.S.2d 709 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1943), afJ'd, 268 App. Div. 377, 51 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1944), afJ'd,
295 N.Y. 254, 66 N.E.2d 705 (1946).
33. People v. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 168 N.E.2d 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960); People
v. Barondess, 133 N.Y. 649, 31 N.E. 240, 16 N.Y.S. 436 (1892); People v. Weinseimer, 117
App. Div. 603, 102 N.Y.S. 579 (1907), afJ'd, 190 N.Y. 537, 83 N.E. 1129 (1908); People v.
Adelstein, 9 A.D.2d 907, 195 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1959), aff'd sub nom. People v. Squillante, 8
N.Y.2d 998, 169 N.E.2d 425, 205 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1960).
34. 410 U.S. at 400.
35. 91 CONG. R c. 11908 (1945) (remarks of Representative Hobbs).
36. The following colloquy is illustrative:
MR. MARCANTONIO: All right. In connection with a strike, if an incident occurs which
involves-
MR. HoBas: The gentleman need go no further. This bill does not cover strikes or
any question relating to strikes.
MR. MARCANTONZO: Will the gentleman put a provision in the bill stating so?
MR- HOBBS: We do not have to, because a strike is perfectly lawful and has been so
described by the Supreme Court and by the statutes we have passed. This bill takes
off from the springboard that the act must be unlawful to come within the purview
of this bill.
MR. MARCANTONIO: That does not answer my point. My point is that an incident
such as a simple assault which takes place in a strike could happen. Am I correct?
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conceded that while militant labor activities might constitute breaches
of the peace, those activities do not constitute extortion when used in
pursuit of legitimate labor objectivesY7
The original Federal Anti-Racketeering Act contained a definition
of "wrongful" as being "in violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State or Territory""8 but no cases construed this defini-
tion, and it was omitted from the Hobbs Act. A dissent in United
States v. Kemble"9 by Chief Judge Biggs concluded that "wrongful"
was properly construed to necessitate a criminal as opposed to a tor-
tious intent. The majority opinion in Enmons follows this train of
thought and imposes the traditional requirement of a mens rea in
prosecutions for extortion under the Hobbs Act.
Judicial support for the majority's holding can be gleaned from
prior cases which involved prosecutions for extortion under the Hobbs
Act. It is significant that in the prior cases the prosecutions were based
upon the "wrongful" use of violence or force as "wrongful" was in-
terpreted in Enmons. The "corrupt" objectives are illustrated by per-
sonal payoffs, 40 "wage" extractions from employers for "imposed, un-
wanted, superfluous and fictitious" services of workers, 41 professional
"gangsterism," 42 the elimination of business competition,48  or the
misuse of public office.44 In each of these cases, the "wrongful" use of
force was related to the objective sought and not the means used.
In the area of labor-management relations, it should be noted that
MR. HOBBS: Certainly.
MR. MARCANTONiO: That then would become an extortion under the gentleman's
bill, and that striker . . . could be charged with violation of sections in this bill.
MR. HOBBS: I disagree with that and deny it in toto.
89 CONG. REc. 3213 (1943). Other Congressmen expressed similar views:
MR. MICHENER: .. . [I]n my opinion this bil[ will not interfere with legitimate
strikes. It is not so intended.
91 CONG. REc. 11843 (1945).
MR. SUMNERS: ... [T]here is not a thing in it to interfere in the slightest degree
with any legitimate activity on the part of labor people or labor unions ....
Id. at 11908. See 91 CONG. Rac. 11841, 11900-01, 11909, 11912, 11917 (1945); 89 CONG. REC.
3201, 3213 (1943).
37. 315 U.S. at 523. "Those who use coercion to secure genuine employment are en-
gaged in a legitimate labor objective; their activities, although perhaps constituting
breaches of the peace, do not partake of the nature of extortion." Id.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 420b(a) (1940).
39. 198 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1952).
40. United States v. Iozzi, 420 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kramer, 355
F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1966); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1955).
41. United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1955); United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889
(3d Cir. 1952).
42. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963).
43. United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969).
44. United States v. De Sapio, 299 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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when an employer seeks services from wanted employees he is not
having his property misappropriated although he may disagree with
his employees as to the worth of the services rendered. What each re-
ceives is their respective "quid pro quo" of work for wages. The major-
ity opinion dealt with this concept by holding that without a misap-
propriation of property there can be no unlawful taking of another's
property, which would be necessary to constitute extortion. 45
The legislative history reinforces this conclusion, for the proponents
not only specified what would be necessary to constitute an offence, 46
but they also specified that a mere threat does not alone constitute ex-
tortion. There must be an unlawful taking in addition to the threat.47
While the threat is undoubtedly a "wrongful" means; to constitute ex-
tortion, the threat must conjoin with an "unlawful" taking, which is
a misappropriation of property with a felonious intent. A demand by
a recognized union for higher wages does not fit into the concept of
misappropriation of another's property, and thus there cannot be ex-
tortion without the requisite misappropriation.
The majority opinion thus recognizes the requirement of a "corrupt
intent" as set forth in both the common law and the statutory law
upon which the Hobbs Act's definition of extortion was based. In its
interpretation the majority adheres to the principle that where a
criminal statute fails to include the requisite criminal intent tradi-
tionally required in both common and statutory law, Congress will be
presumed to have intended to have included it absent an express con-
trary intent.48
45. 410 U.S. at 400.
46. 91 CONG. REc. 11903 (1945) (remarks of Representative Gwynne):
First, they would need to prove that the activity complained of in some way affected
interstate commerce; second they would have to prove that there was an actual, not
a theoretical, taking of personal property; third, they would have to prove that the
taking was by violence, by personal violence, or by actual threats of personal violence;
and then, fourth, they would have to prove that the acts done . . . they might be
violent, they might take something, but the Government would have to prove in
addition that the acts done did not come within the exceptions set out in Title III
[now section (c)].
47. 91 CONG. REC. 11908 (1945) (remarks of Representatives Walter and Voorhis):
MR. WALTER: Our distinguished colleague from Iowa [Mr. Gwynne] pointed out the
elements that it would be necessary to prove in order to make out a crime [see note
46 supra] and I call the gentleman's attention to the fact that a mere threat does not
constitute a crime. There must accompany that threat an unlawful taking.
MR. VOORIS: I thank the gentleman. And certainly demands for higher wages or
attempts to collect union dues are not unlawful acts by any stretch of the imagination.
Id. In response to the statement of Representative Voorhis, Representative Hobbs agreed:
May I add that the gentleman, in my opinion, is exactly correct and takes the proper
position in his questions.
Id.
48. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
390
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THE DISSENT
The minority opinion, authored by Justice Douglas, fails to deal
with the constructional problems set forth by the majority. The minor-
ity opinion incorrectly deletes the word "wrongful" from its reference
to the statutory definition and then reaches the conclusion that the use
of violence to obstruct commerce constitutes extortion, and therefore
the dismissal of the indictment by the district court was error.49
The minority concedes that the violence used in this case occurred
during a lawful strike by the recognized unions. The objective of the
strike was higher wages, and thus was a legitimate labor objective. The
minority however, then proceeds to attempt judicial legislation when
they state that "[t]he term 'extortion' means the use of violence to
obtain 'property' from another."50 Continuing from this partial and
incorrect statement of the statutory definition, the minority seeks sup-
port for their conclusion from the fact that the immunity clause of the
Federal Anti-Racketeering Act was deleted in the enactment of the
Hobbs Act.51 The minority concludes ". . . the use of violence to
obtain higher wages is plainly a method of obtaining property from
another" within the meaning of the Hobbs Act and therefore such vio-
lence constitutes extortion.52
The minority would uphold the indictment on the theory that it
is the use of violent means the Hobbs Act proscribes, regardless of the
objective sought. However, the minority severely compromises their
theory, for they cite United States v. Caldes5" stating that Caldes held
that the Hobbs Act is not directed to the "mischievous" or "low-level"
violence which accompanies a protracted labor dispute.54 Albeit, the
court of appeals in Caldes was presented with a factual situation in-
volving "low-level" violence, the opinion in Caldes specifically deals
with the issues presented and discussed by the majority in Enmons.
Caldes holds that in a prosecution for extortion under the Hobbs Act,
the government must prove that the defendant possessed a requisite
felonious intent to obtain property from another. 5 The minority
opinion thus seems to be juxtaposed to the express holding of Caldes,
which they cite in support of their view.
49. 410 U.S. at 417. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
50. 410 U.S. at 417.
51. See note 23 supra.
52. 410 U.S. at 417.
53. 457 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1972).
54. 410 U.S. at 418 n.17, citing 457 F.2d at 78-79.
55. 457 F.2d at 78.
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COMMENT
The construction of the Hobbs Act by the majority is in line with
the traditional concepts of extortion. Since extortion has generally
been interpreted to require a felonious or corrupt intent, their inter-
pretation of the word "wrongful" seems to be proper, for by placing
this interpretation on "wrongful" the Court has prevented the Hobbs
Act from becoming a manacle on organized labor. Although the law
condemns the defrauding of another of his property, the coercion of an
employment relationship is not an end that the law condemns.56 The
interpretation of extortion under the Hobbs Act by the majority does
not proscribe the legitimate activities of unions, but it curbs those ac-
tivities which in no way relate to the furtherance of legitimate labor
objectives. The use of violence to obtain property to which the actor
has no right is properly condemned under the statute, as interpreted
by the majority. This interpretation does not make militant labor
activity extortion per se, but looks to the objective sought by the actor.
The minority opinion, however, looks only to the means utilized and
concludes that if those means are violent, then the violence is properly
condemned by the Hobbs Act as extortion. If the word "wrongful" is
deleted from the statute, as the minority did, then it is difficult to
imagine any coercive activity used by labor which would not fit within
this adulterated concept of extortion.
None of the federal courts which have faced the problem of violence
affecting commerce have sanctioned the violence. If the case was one
in which a prosecution could properly be based on the Hobbs Act,
then the prosecution was allowed. 57 If a prosecution under the Hobbs
Act was not proper, however, the courts have repeatedly stressed that
the criminal processes of the particular states involved can and should
be invoked to punish the violence under the appropriate state laws.
The fact that violence has occurred and should be punished should
not cause a total loss of perspective in dealing with the violence. Under
the minority opinion, extortion would be converted to the simplistic
use of force to obtain property from another. If Congress had intended
this construction, the Hobbs Act crime of extortion would have been
defined as the obstruction of interstate commerce by violence, rather
than as it is presently delimited. The minority opinion also slights the
56. United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889, 899 (3rd Cir. 1952) (Staley, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 522 (1942).
57. See cases cited notes 40-44 supra.
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inclusion of section (c), 58 which specifically states that nothing in the
Hobbs Act shall be deemed to affect those statutes which are con-
sidered the "Magna Carta" of labor. Nothing in those statutes author-
izes labor to use violence in its attempts to obtain legitimate labor ob-
jectives. The National Labor Relations Act has been interpreted to
condemn the destruction of an employer's property as an unfair labor
practice."" The fact that such acts may be unfair labor practice does
not mean that those acts therefore constitute extortion.
Labor has no special right to use violence, even in pursuit of proper
objectives, but labor does have the right shared by all to be properly
charged and tried for the crimes that are alleged to have been com-
mitted. In an offense requiring a felonious intent, the intent is part
and parcel of the offense, and cannot be dispensed with regardless of
the enormity of the transgression. As the concurring opinion by Jus-
tice Blackmun states, if the minority would exempt from punishment
"low-level" violence used to obtain legitimate labor objectives, then
they have created an unknowable crime which could be arbitrarily
and selectively enforced.6 0 The courts would then be caught in the
quagmire of distinguishing exempt "low-level" violence from non-
exempt violence.
If the intent of Congress in enacting the Hobbs Act was as the
minority states, then it seems that Congress overshot its mark by using
the compound felony of extortion to proscribe such activities. The
Court, however, must take the statute as it is set forth by Congress.
Should a "correction" be necessary, then Congress, not the Court,
should enact the change.
Philip Dayne Freeman
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(c) (1970).
59. New Power Wire & Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1965),
60. 410 U.S. at 412.
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